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Abstract: There is increasing attention given to the concept
of trustworthiness for artificial intelligence and robotics.
However, trust is highly context-dependent, varies among
cultures, and requires reflection on others’ trustworthiness,
appraising whether there is enough evidence to conclude
that these agents deserve to be trusted. Moreover, little
research exists on what happens when too much trust is
placed in robots and autonomous systems. Conceptual
clarity and a shared framework for approaching overtrust
are missing. In this contribution, we offer an overview
of pressing topics in the context of overtrust and robots
and autonomous systems. Our review mobilizes insights
solicited from in-depth conversations from a multidisci-
plinary workshop on the subject of trust in human–robot
interaction (HRI), held at a leading robotics conference in
2020. A broad range of participants brought in their exper-
tise, allowing the formulationof a forward-looking research
agenda on overtrust and automation biases in robotics
and autonomous systems. Key points include the need
for multidisciplinary understandings that are situated in
an eco-system perspective, the consideration of adjacent
concepts such as deception and anthropomorphization,
a connection to ongoing legal discussions through the
topic of liability, and a socially embedded understanding
of overtrust in education and literacy matters. The article
integrates diverse literature and provides a ground for
commonunderstanding for overtrust in the context ofHRI.
Keywords: trust, overtrust, robots, social robots, decep-
tion, anthropomorphization liability, education
1 Introduction
We live in a time of increasing reliance on algorithmic
systems for a multitude of activities. Simple activities,
such as using an app to find the nearest shared bike, as
well as more complex tasks, like voting or getting a job,
are often directly affected by decision-making processes
carried out by algorithms. When decision-making agents
become embodied, as is the case for social robots, under-
standing trust and overtrust becomes particularly impor-
tant as these agents increasingly become parts of natural
contexts inwhich developers have little control of the robot’s
surroundings. In addition, the increased human-likeness of
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certain robots invites humans to trust them in a way distinct
from that of, say, a robot arm in a car factory. In the words of
the European Commission, “as digital technology becomes
an ever more central part of every aspect of people’s lives,
people should be able to trust it. Trustworthiness is also
a prerequisite for its uptake” [1]. In this article, we refer to
robots or robotics when we mean embodied agents, while
the term autonomous system is used more broadly to
include embodied as well as virtual systems that interact
with individuals.
In robotics and autonomous system literature, the
most common definitions of trust in automation are the
following: Lee and See define trust “as the attitude that
an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a
situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability”
[2]. Meyerson et al. defined trust as “a unique form of
collective perception and relating that is capable of mana-
ging issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expecta-
tions” [3], while Hancock characterized trust as a reliance
on others not to perform actions that are prejudicial to
their own well-being [4]. Trust is thus a relational concept,
as it is used to describe the trustor’s positive expectations
of the trustee in uncertain circumstances [5]. Levine and
Schweitzer [6] distinguished between what they call ben-
evolence-based trust and integrity-based trust, in which
the first regards the goodness and intentions of the trustee
and the latter concerns adherence to acceptable ethical
principles. Furthermore, trust is highly context-dependent
and varies among cultures [7]. It requires reflection
on others’ trustworthiness, appraising whether there is
enough evidence to conclude that these agents deserve
to be trusted. The most salient criteria for trustworthi-
ness are truthfulness, lack of exploitation of the depen-
dent party’s vulnerabilities, the constructive contribu-
tion to expected benefits, and the willingness by the
trusted party to be held accountable [8].
Unfortunately, highly automated systems (and espe-
cially robots) are at risk of being overtrusted. Lee and See
defined overtrust as an insufficient calibration between
the system’s capabilities and a person’s trust [2]. Para-
suraman and Riley added that a system can compromise
safety and profitability if it has been inappropriately
relied upon [9]. Yet, while policymakers in Europe high-
light the importance of trust in a (robotically) mediated
world [1,10], research on what happens when too much
trust is placed in robots and autonomous systems is quite
novel [11,12]. Therefore, we call for new research on over-
trust not only in the robotics community but also among
social scientists, legal scholars, and policymakers.
On 4 September 2020, we held a half-day workshop
at the 29th IEEE International Conference on Robot &
Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN).¹ The work-
shop was held online through Zoom and focused on sharing
knowledge about how to understand and address overtrust
in robots. It brought together a group of researchers and
practitioners from various disciplines, including law, ethics,
communication, philosophy, science and technology
studies, cognitive anthropology, computer science, and
robotics engineering. A call for extended abstracts was
circulated on social media (Twitter) and through the per-
sonal networks of the organizers. This resulted in seven
accepted contributions that were subsequently presented
and discussed at the workshop. The topics covered the
black box problem/transparency, the notions of overtrust
leading to over-reliance, liability risks, deception, the role
of robots in human participant research, and a spotlight on
the Wizard of Oz (WoZ) technique.
In addition, a leading human–robot interaction (HRI)
researcher held a keynote on moral psychology in HRI.
Finally, around 15 RO-MAN attendants who did not pre-
sent an extended abstract joined the workshop and the
discussions, leading to an overall number of 25 partici-
pants. The workshop participants investigated what hap-
pens when trust becomes overtrust, and automation bias,
erroneous belief in technological capabilities, seeps in.
They analysed scenarios in which trust in automation
becomes destructive for individuals, groups of indivi-
duals, and society at large; in particular, when overtrust
leads to physical (e.g. injuries, damages) and psycholo-
gical (e.g. manipulation) consequences. The workshop
participants were asked during the last interactive ses-
sion of the workshop to identify the key topics and issues
discussed throughout the morning. Each participant was
given a chance to respond to the comments of the others.
During these discussions, the moderators’ task was to distil
and re-group common issues that were raised to determine
a research agenda that covered each participant’s central
topics. This brainstorming and synthesis activity aimed to
distil critical issues thatwill (and should) be subject of further
research in the coming years concerning overtrust and HRI.
Following up on the workshop, the moderators reached
out to the presenters and selected participants to ask if they
were interested in writing an agenda paper. Most presenters
and approached participants agreed to be involved. To start
the joint writing project, the involved authors developed the
research agenda identified during the workshop and elabo-
rated further upon those topics. In subsequent months, the
writing happened as a collective effort, with each co-author
bringing in their expertise on the topic. The paper’s goal

1 See http://ro-man2020.unina.it/.
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was to synthesize the workshop discussions and expand on
them by developing a forward-looking research agenda on
overtrust and robots.
In this article, we would like to share this agenda
with the larger research community. Below we combine
a summary of important discussions during the workshop
and identify research gaps.
2 What we know about overtrust
and robots
HRI has started to look into overtrust in the context of robots.
Wagner et al. provided an accessible overview of the litera-
ture and some earlier research [12]. They described overtrust
as “a situation in which a person misunderstands the risk
associated with an action because the person either under-
estimates the loss associated with a trust violation; under-
estimates the chance the robot will make such a mistake; or
both” (p. 22). Using the example of paediatric exoskeletons,
they showedhowchildrenmayovertrust thedevice’s capabil-
ities, overlooking their limitations, and how parents may be
too emotionally invested to appropriately assess risks.
Broadly speaking the concept of overtrust falls within
the topic of misuse of automation, i.e. using automation
under false beliefs leading to its inappropriate use [9].
Overtrust is related to automation bias [13], where indi-
viduals think that technology is more capable than it
really is, and complacency [14], when individuals become
less vigilant towards the functioning of a system even
though attention should be paid to it. Traditionally, key
technologies investigated in research on overtrust have
been autopilots and automation in factories [9,14,15]. How-
ever, Wagner and colleagues stress the heightened impor-
tance of research on the topic with advances in AI and
robotics, as an increasing number of systems have become
more autonomous in recent years [12].
Even if the literature on overtrust is still emerging,
it builds upon a rich literature on trust in automation
overall, e.g. refs [2,16–18], and in particular research
that analysed the impact on trust when errors are intro-
duced, e.g. refs [2,19,20]. Indeed, the introduction of
errors or malfunctioning of systems leads to recalibration
of the possible initial positive expectations towards the
working of a system (so-called “positivity bias” [18, p. 699]).
In other words, the human operator or a system must re-
calibrate their trust in the system and implement control
strategies for it [20]. However, in cases of overtrust, either
the errors are not perceived per se, or a recalibration process
does not occur. This is why the topic of overtrust is, as
mentioned, interlinked with complacency and automation
bias. In contrast to complacency though (understood as
a lack of vigilance over the functioning of a system), over-
trust is understood as having a more active meaning, as
an individual is actively assuming a greater capability of
the system than they should [14].
Even though the concept and definition of overtrust
in automation were introduced by the end of the 1990s
[2,9], the HRI community has only recently focused on
overtrust. Depending on its severity, overtrust can have
different consequences. For example, Gaudiello et al.
have studied the effects of human conformity following
robot suggestions [21]. They found that individuals have
a tendency to adapt and change their answers in order to
comply with a robot’s suggestions. This outcome could be
useful for educational purposes, such as when the robot
works as a tutor for a child. However, this case also sits at
the borderline of overtrust. While the compliance with
the robot’s suggestion might not be risky, and sometimes
even desirable (especially when a robot has more up-to-
date or better quality information than the user), it could
also create a chain of events whereby trust in a system
leads to overtrust.
Salem et al. studied the effects of a robot presenting
a faulty behaviour, and how participants would react
to the odd requests by the robot [22]. The participants per-
formed most of the tasks requested by the robot even if they
were causing property damage or information leakage. The
authors concluded that “although the robot’s erratic beha-
viour affected its perceived reliability and trustworthiness,
this had no impact on participants’ willingness to comply
with its instructions, even in the case of unusual requests”
[22, p. 7]. Another example of overtrust is provided by Robin-
ette et al., where participants were put into a realistic emer-
gency scenario and still had a strong tendency to follow a
robot that earlier expressed faulty behaviour, rather than
following the emergency signs [11].
Few researchers in HRI have looked at overtrust from
the psychological perspective. Social Engineering (SE) is
a psychological manipulation that induces people to take
actions that may or may not be in their best interest [23].
These techniques may take advantage of the trust and
kindness displayed by humans to conspecifics [24]. Post-
nikoff and Goldberg started working on the theoretical
concept of SE robots [25], while Booth et al. used a robot
as a proxy to enter an unauthorized location by piggy-
backing [26]. Aroyo et al. further worked on a practical
application by mapping an already perfected SE frame-
work on a robotic setting where the robot succeeded to
acquire personal sensitive information from participants,
made them conform to its suggestions, and gamble money
[27]. Finally, Aroyo et al. studied the effect of authority
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from a highly human-like robot on participants, making
them obey morally controversial requests that violate pre-
established rules [28].
This overview of the literature shows that overtrusting
robots can have adverse consequences. Although trust is
essential for HRI, our disposition may effectively generate
overtrust that could potentially endanger humans physi-
cally and psychologically. The overview also shows that
the study of overtrust in robots has mainly been a topic in
HRI research and social psychology but has received less
attention in other disciplines such as philosophy, the law,
sociology, and communication. To provide a broader take
on the topic that includes perspectives from the social
sciences and humanities, in addition to technical consid-
erations, the participants of the IEEE RO-MAN workshop
set out a research agenda summarizing the main discus-
sion points of the workshop and providing an outlook on
new inquiry on this research topic. However, it is impor-
tant to clarify that this research agenda does not aim at
exhaustively listing all the topics that could possibly affect
the level of trust invested in robots. It is clear that many
other factors may be identified and analysed with respect
to overtrust. Rather, this overview highlights some of the
most pressing discussion points that ought to be further
assessed and explored.
3 Overtrust research agenda 2021
Overtrust is inherently linked to trust, but goes beyond
a level that is rationally or objectively ideal or suitable.
In a sense, we notice a gap or mismatch between what is
and what is expected – this gap can be explained by over-
trust. As a workshop participant put it, “Intuitively, it
[overtrust] seems like a very strange concept as it puts
a scale on trusting relationships, but one that extends
past the level of optimal or desirable trust, or even suffi-
cient trust.” Borenstein et al. state that in the context of
robotics, overtrust portrays a situation in which a person
accepts risk because the robot appears to, or is expected
to, perform a function it cannot, or, in another context,
when a person engages in risky behaviours because they
believe that the robot will help mitigate the risk [29]. As
elaborated above in the literature review (see Section 2),
there are still many aspects of overtrust in automation,
and overtrust in robotics in particular, that require mul-
tidisciplinary research to better distil the relevant fac-
tors that contribute to situations which extend the “level
of desirable trust.” The following research agenda points
to the key and, in our opinion, most pressing, topics iden-
tified during the IEEE RO-MAN 2020 workshop (see Sec-
tion 1):
1. The term “overtrust” requires further interdisciplinary
conceptualization to make research on the topic more
comparable across disciplines and weave in lessons
learned from each field into the policymaking discourse;
2. The effects and implications of deception on trust and
overtrust must be understood more comprehensively
as manipulation by autonomous systems is a key chal-
lenge of new technological developments (e.g. artifi-
cially intelligent systems, see the proposal for AI Act in
the EU [30]);
3. The role of anthropomorphization in trusting relation-
ships must be better understood in automation and
specifically in the context of embodied agents inter-
acting with individuals (e.g. social robots) to address
potential biases andmisconceptions formed especially
by more vulnerable individuals (e.g. children, elderly,
marginalized communities);
4. An analysis of the ecosystem(s) in which overtrust most
often occurs should be conducted to identify roles and
responsibilities and ensure systems are safe to use
(to the whole extent of the word, see the dimensions
of safety in ref. [31]) and designed in a transparent
manner that allows us to allocate accountability [32];
5. Regulatory tools such as liability regulation need to be
analysed towards creating appropriate risk-allocation
among different stakeholders; and
6. Literacy and educational initiatives must be devel-
oped to empower users to identify potentially undesir-
able trusting relationships with automation.
Addressing these issues will require collaborative
efforts frommultiple disciplines beyond the HRI community.
3.1 The need for multidisciplinary
definitions
Settling on a definition that specifies necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of “overtrust” was challenging, but the
workshop participants agreed that overtrust refers to
situations where a robot or an automated system’s expected
performance exceeds its actual constraints. While the term
conjured many different associations furthering concepts of
trust, overtrust, and deception, reliance was ultimately con-
sidered paramount to such definition.
Trust, it should be noted, has long been understood
as a relational construct [33]. Simmel’s work on trust [34]
offers an understanding built not only on the functional
dimension of trust related to risk-taking and cooperation
[35,36] but also on its embeddedness in systems of belief,
particularly with reference to trust as a state of mind, or
as faith. In the 1990s, scholars began to explore and
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understand the connections between trust and social
capital and focused on the development and mainte-
nance of relationships and social order [37,38]. It will
be critical to explore these dimensions of trust in relation
to human–machine interaction and communication as
humans develop new relationships with machines, parti-
cularly ones such as robots, digital voice assistants, and
other kinds of intelligent agents [39–41].
Fundamentally, trust is a relational concept, based
around vulnerability and the belief by an agent (trustor)
that another entity (trustee) will do as expected. Both risk
and interdependence are essential in sociological and
economic conceptualizations of trust [42,43]. On one
hand, risk is typically classified as the (perceived) prob-
ability of an uncontrolled loss. Without risk, trust is
somewhat less relevant, as the trustor is not dependent
on some other agent to reduce their own vulnerability to
the said risk. With respect to risks, it has been suggested
that a risk-based approach could be applied to prevent
negative incidents [44]. On the other hand, interdepen-
dence is defined as a state in which one party has to rely
on another to achieve a specific desired outcome. While
these characteristics of trust pertain to trust in automa-
tion, trust in automation is characterized by additional
factors that relate to the technology itself [45].
Some propose that the factors promoting trust in
automation include the reliability, validity, and robustness
of algorithmic systems [45,46]. These factors are said to
strengthen the performance aspects of technology and pro-
mote trustworthy algorithmic systems. Trustworthy systems
should be predictable (i.e. work the way they are supposed
to), robust (withstand outside tampering), and able to fulfil
the activity required of them. Since algorithmic systems are
not single entities but interconnected elements that are
deliberately or organically organized in a way that achieves
a particular outcome, trust in automation includes not only
factors related to performance but also those necessary for
individuals to interact with them. These factors include tra-
ditionally human concepts, such as expertise and person-
ality traits, environmental or cultural influences, the pur-
pose(s) underlying an algorithmic system, as well as the
intention(s) of those operating such systems [4,16,22,46].
These factors lead to trustable algorithmic systems or sys-
tems that a specified community accepts as competent,
genuine, and/or honest.
3.2 Deception by robots
While potentially problematic for various reasons, we
know that people trust robots in some contexts, and that
robotic researchers actively cultivate trust-based relation-
ships. Humans have evolved to depend on both informa-
tion and practical support from other agents, which puts
us at the risk of deception. If each individual had full
and correct information in all situations, and the power
to effect the changes they desired, they would not have
to rely on others, and deception would not be as much
of a problem as when we have to rely on veracity of the
information provided by others and that they do the things
they say– or we expect – them to do. In this context, it is
useful to distinguish between epistemic trust in the quality
of information we may acquire from robots, and pragmatic
trust in a robot’s physical capabilities. Trust in the quality
of information partly requires that we trust the intentions
and integrity of the sender of information, and while we
will not assume that a robot is capable of having inten-
tions, some people will in fact attribute such capabilities
to robots. The discrepancy between what people believe
a robot to be capable of (i.e. intentions and goodwill)
and what a robot is actually capable of, has given rise to
the notion that robots can be deceptive [47]. This will be
examined in more detail below, as we examine different
forms of robot deception. An example of such being robots
that are designed to give the impression of empathy, with
the goal of making a human believe it really has such
capabilities, in order to elicit a certain response fromusers.
Some will argue that robots are not deceptive per se,
as it is people’s tendency to anthropomorphize tech-
nology that is problematic, i.e. our capacity to “imagine
greater competence than is actually present” [48, p. 125].
In this view, people will deceive themselves into believing
that just about anything is capable of having, for example,
intentions and a purpose [49]. We argue that responsible
social robotics requires designers to account for the
human tendency to anthropomorphize technology. Robot
deception may thus be intentional, or simply follow from
negligence. As anthropomorphization of social robots can
have effects on overtrust, it is necessary to not only be
aware of active efforts to encourage this but also to proac-
tively counteract unintended and unfortunate anthropo-
morphization [50].
Deception is central for the evolution of many intel-
ligent systems. The most interesting question for HRI is
often when and how a robot can be used for deception,
rather than whether it can be deceptive per se [4,51]. Like
in experimental psychology [52], deception on some
level is arguably integral to research practices in social
robotics. Quite often, researchers rely on a “manipula-
tion technique” known as WoZ to control “the robot as
a puppet to uncover specific social human behaviours
when confronted with a machine” [53, p. 3]. Here, an ex-
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perimenter or confederate operates the robot, without
the research subject being aware, controlling various
input variables in accordance with careful and meticu-
lously described protocols for the particular study. In
many cases, these kinds of simulations are necessary
to learn about human–machine interactions, due to
technological or other constraints [54]. There is nothing
inherently suspicious or unacceptable with this research
paradigm. But when an astute human agent is kept in
the interactional loop, experimenters and robot-designers
may also inadvertently create conditions for overattri-
buting the robot’s capabilities, which in turn may result
in overtrust. In HRI this has necessitated rigorous reporting
guidelines about WoZ protocols, and the role played by
“wizards” in these interactions, including information
about variables such as their demographics, training level,
error rate, production- and recognition variables, and
familiarity with the experimental hypothesis [54]. In terms
of overtrust, these experimental practices may be conse-
quential when social robots migrate from the cultural con-
text of the research laboratory and into the outside world,
like when social robots are considered implemented
in healthcare practices. Just like with folk-concepts like
“sociality,” we need more empirical research on how trust
and overtrust are created and maintained through joint,
situated interactions between robots and their human
interlocutors, as well as how design choices shape these
encounters (see, for instance, [55]). From an ethical, legal,
and social perspective, there is a need to understand
the design choices that lead people to trust or distrust
intelligent machines. Sometimes this means that we must
extend our unit of analysis to encompass robot designers
and experimenters in HRI (i.e. “wizards”). Insights about
folk-theories of trust and overtrust that inform the design
choices of roboticists and others involved in the making of
robots can be acquired from ethnographic research of their
work in naturalistic contexts (e.g. ref. [56]). One should,
in other words, not heed the advice of The Wizard, if he
booms: “pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!”.²
Shim and Arkin provided a detailed examination of
robot deception and the potential benefits of deception
for HRI [57]. In doing so, they also provide a taxonomy
of robot deception, with three dimensions (interaction
object, goal, and type), each divided into two categories.
As we later argue that deception impacts overtrust, their
framework is useful for categorizing the target of decep-
tion, the reason for deception, and intentionality. For
example, a robot can deceive a human or another robot
(target), it can deceive in order to promote the perceived
interests of the target or someone else (goal/reason), and
it can deceive by physical or behavioural means (type)
[57]. Another typology consists of three types: external,
superficial, and hidden state deception [58]. The first
relates to how a robot may deceive about other things
than itself, such as a weather forecast. The second involves
deception leading humans to believe the robot has capa-
cities it does not, such as emotions, hopes, and desires.
Hidden state deception occurs when we disguise actual
features. These three categories are useful for categorizing
the deception involved in encouraging or discouraging
anthropomorphism, to which we shortly turn.
In closing, deception by robots is not inherently bad.
More than that, it can be required for facilitating effective
HRI, and it can even have positive consequences for the
humans interacting with the robots [59,60]. While trust
is important in human affairs, prosocial deception – for
example white lies, games, and theatre – is also integral
to our social interactions [61]. Robot deception can,
in some situations, increase efficiency in care situations
and levels of cooperation in games, increase human social
engagement where the robot is present, and help build
human–machine trust [50,62]. Furthermore, current social
robots are not intentional agents, meaning that any decep-
tion is a byproduct of human design, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally. Not all deception is intentional,
and robot deception can occur through coincidence or
neglect [5]. Furthermore, deceptions are sometimes used by
experimenters to elicit specific interactional effects when
subjects are interacting with robots in the research labora-
tory. A designer that merely attempts to design a useful
robot that uses, for example, referential and mutual gaze
to improve the effectiveness of human interaction with the
robot might end up creating a robot that deceives users into
thinking it is something it is not. Our use of the concept of
deception is thus based on a focus on the target of deception
and not the intentions to deceive [5,63].
3.3 Does anthropomorphization lead to
greater overtrust?
Social robots are increasingly embedded in numerous
aspects of our lives, often at home or in the workspace.
Their capabilities to mimic human speech, monitor our
behaviours, and be part of social activities are social
functions that all contribute to their “human likeness.”
However, these anthropomorphic features might obscure
certain risks, for example concerning privacy [64], or

2 Line spoken by The Wizard of Oz, played by Frank Morgan, in the
film The Wizard of Oz, directed by Victor Fleming (1939).
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cloud our understanding that these robots are mere
machines. While not robot-specific, anthropomorphism
becomes highly relevant as robots increasingly mimic
human features and capabilities [47,65].
This has led some to suggest that avoiding anthro-
pomorphization is necessary for preventing overtrust [12].
These (perceived) blurred boundaries between humans
and machines will make the overtrust phenomenon more
relevant. Although people may be more vigilant in the
early stages of introducing social robots, they may gradu-
ally be more willing to (over)trust a social robot that looks
and sounds like them more easily than a smart home
appliance, such as a vacuum [66,67].
Due to the complicated nature of the relationship
between anthropomorphism and overtrust, the advice
to avoid anthropomorphism appears to be too simplistic.
Another possibility is to consider overtrust as a result of
a lack of anthropomorphizing. When overtrust arises
due to human goodwill, anthropomorphism may further
exaggerate such tendencies. However, as mentioned,
overtrust can be rooted in the robot’s (real or idealized)
capabilities, regardless of anthropomorphism. In these
circumstances, using deception to actively encourage
anthropomorphism might counter the tendency to over-
trust. Anthropomorphism has essential effects on trust, as it
can decrease initial expectations of robots and influence the
human reaction to error [50]. As anthropomorphism entails
projecting human characteristics onto robots, it might be
used to encourage humans that interact with robots to per-
ceive the robots as susceptible to error, much like humans.
While anthropomorphism might help reduce overtrust
caused by faith in the objectivity and infallibility of
machines, alternatively, it could lead to other problems
related to the perceived capabilities, for example, good-
ness or intent. In addition, we need to separate integrity-
based overtrust from reliability-based. In the latter case,
prosocial deception and the equivalent of robot white lies
can enable designers to counteract overtrust, or at the very
least, alleviate the adverse effects that stem from overtrust.
Solutions to avoid overtrusting robots have been
sought. For example, deceptive practices could spur indi-
viduals to proactively engage in a situation rather than
merely (over)relying on robots, thus encouraging the
view of a robot as a social partner [68]. By equipping
the robot with eyes, for example, the robot would appear
to engage in mutual gaze and referential and deictic gaze
in order to facilitate joint attention and encourage a set of
beneficial human responses [62]. For instance, the social
robot Pepper (Softbank) comes equipped with a random
selection of micro-movements pertaining to eye gaze and
hands, which create an impression that the machine is
pragmatically competent. Mutual gaze increases trust and
initiates joint attention, which could enable the robot
to lead and divert human attention to important features
of the environment, such as exit signs [69].
The extent to which humans will develop relation-
ships with robots may also lead to potentially dangerous
situations. The literature on trust and technology adop-
tion indicates that users’ expectations and experiences
shape these encounters in fundamental ways, although
some have hypothesized that human trust in robots may
differ from other kinds of autonomous technologies [4].
Consequently, perceptions of robots, whether based on
personal dispositions, direct experiences, or influence
from widespread social norms and cultural representa-
tions in media, will likely form a complex baseline for
trust in robots [70]. It is possible then to imagine sce-
narios in which users may, over a long period, interact
with a robot in ways that cultivate trust, only to find that
this trust breaks down at a particularly critical juncture,
and should not be maintained in the future. Whether
autonomous systems act as an empirical observer and
reporter, or an interpreter of data and input (or possibly
some combination of the two) will have consequences for
trustworthiness.
3.4 Mapping the ecosystem
Robots and autonomous systems are far from being pure
standalone objects that evolve within a clearly delineated
space, but rather blur the traditional boundaries between
products and services, disrupting existing paradigms
[71]. As components in complex cyber–physical systems,
robots, whether in the form of unmanned aircraft, auto-
nomous transportation systems, or humanoid social
robots, involve multiple actors and heavily interacting
elements, which are highly connected and data reliant
mediums [72]. As such, these socio-technological arte-
facts can only be apprehended and understood within a
larger context, that is the social and technical ecosystem
in which they evolve and through which they acquire
their functions and values [73]. The notion of institu-
tion-based trust is sometimes used to describe this eco-
system and its relevance for interactions. In the context
of online transactions and e-commerce, such institu-
tion-based trust is defined as “the belief that needed
structural conditions are present (e.g. in the Internet)
to enhance the probability of achieving a successful out-
come in an endeavour like e-commerce” [74, p. 339] and
acts as a precondition for more specific trusting beliefs
(e.g. in an online vendor).
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Building trust in associated ecosystems remains a
central challenge to building trust in robotics generally
[75]. Exact apprehensions of socio-technological settings
in which they are deployed and used condition the way
by which people leverage trust in them, as well as how their
associated risks are assessed. While fostering trust in stan-
dalone objects themselves, such as a robot or some other
autonomous system, remains critical for success of these
robots or autonomous systems, it is equally important to
extend trust to entire ecosystems. This latter point may be
extremely challenging, given their great complexity and
opaqueness from the perspective of most laypeople.
While fostering trust in robots is important for capi-
talizing on their value and societal benefits, mitigating
overtrust in these complex artefacts will be just as crucial
[76]. There may be potential misalignment between what
human agents think a robotic system is capable of doing
and its actual technological constraints. Overtrust in robots
may also extend to the entire ecosystem in which they are
embedded. For example, if users are sceptical towards insti-
tutionalized healthcare in a given country in general, they
might also be sceptical towards healthcare robots. This
could be problematic in the sense that users or the general
public may never have an adequate understanding of a
robot’s functions and its place in the associated technolo-
gical ecosystem, thereby resulting in a failure to grasp its
inherent risks and potentially forgoing salient benefits.
A clear identification andmapping of different actors,
components, and functions involved in robots and auton-
omous systems, as well as their relation to one another, is
an essential prerequisite for assessing and addressing
risks associated with the operation of social robots [72].
Great attention must therefore be given to delineating
and understanding the layered interactions between socially
situated robots and autonomous systems. Grasping the mul-
tileveled evolution of these robotic ecosystems, from the
microlevel of human–machine interaction to the macrolevel
of policy, legal, and economic systems, remains key for both
fostering adequate trust and averting overtrust. Any policy
or regulatory effort in this direction should be based on a
holistic view of robots as contextually situated in a sea of
social and technical values. Finally, from a liability perspec-
tive, mapping these ecosystemswill greatly facilitate, at least
in theory, the attribution of responsibility, should something
go wrong with a given robot.
3.5 Overtrust and liability
The concept of trust also plays an important role with
regards to liability for damage caused by robots [77–80].
Suppose, for instance, that an autonomous vehicle causes
an accident because the “driver” did not pay attention to
the road as they assumed the autonomous system would
react when necessary (cf. accident with Tesla and Joshua
Brown; see ref. [81]). Overtrusting the autonomous system
of the vehicle led to the accident even though the system
gave signals to the driver to take over the control again.
The question that would arise is whether and under which
circumstances the driver/user of the vehicle can be held
liable for their fault under national law, for instance by
violating a legal rule (e.g. traffic regulations) or acting
negligently [80,82–85]. This will of course also depend
upon the level of autonomy, for which the Society of
Automotive Engineers’ classification system, defining the
degree of driving automation a car and its equipment may
offer, is frequently used (SAE J3016).
Several challenges may arise under this fault-based
liability, such as the question of whether the act of the
vehicle can be attributed to the driver/user. Until now,
it remains uncertain whether a user may actually trust the
autonomous system in the vehicle. In Belgium, for instance,
Article 8.3. of the Highway Code stipulates that the driver
must at all times be able to perform the necessary driving
actions and have his vehicle under control. The same level
of attention is thus still required as from “traditional” dri-
vers, which would undermine the benefits of autonomous
traffic. The question also arises whether it is realistic to
expect the same level of attention and the ability to actually
induce the user/driver to intervene within (fraction of a)
second. Autonomous vehicles will presumably be equipped
with a system that warns users when they should take over
the steering wheel. In case of an emergency, however, this
has to be done in a couple of seconds or even a fraction
thereof. Additionally, this requires the user’s reactions to be
adequate in these circumstances. Cognitive research shows
that these assumptions are unrealistic [82,86,87].
Reliance on other legal regimes may thus be required.
In this regard, objective liability regimes where the proof
of fault is not required are viable options. Alternatively,
reliance on the EU Product Liability Directive is possible
[88,89]. A product is defective when it does not provide the
safety which a person is entitled to expect (see chapters in
ref. [79]). This is the so-called “legitimate expectations”
test, where the concept of trust is at stake again. If a man-
ufacturer emphasizes safety and trust into autonomous
systems, there may be a higher risk of liability as the legit-
imate (safety) expectations of the general public increase
[82,89]. The proper allocation of liability also impacts
the question whether the user/driver can trust the vehicle,
and thus also whether autonomous vehicles will become
a reality/can be further commercialized. To fully realize
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autonomous vehicles (and thus also the many benefits),
the driver/user should actually be allowed to trust the
vehicle without the risk of incurring liability. This means
that supervision is no longer needed, and also implies
that they should not/cannot be held liable when an error
occurs, but instead another party will have to compensate
for the damage, for instance, the insurance company, the
operator, or the producer [80,84,85,90].
The concept of liability/allocation of liabilities will play
an important role in creating trust towards vehicles and
could increase autonomization of traffic. Liability is usually
apprehended by actors as a risk that has to be mitigated.
However, more broadly, liability can also be seen as a trust-
building mechanism. For instance, if an efficient legal
system of liability allocation exists, the victims obtain
effective redress and the actors know when they could be
exposed. Protection and legal certainty are, therefore, two
elements for building trust in these new vehicles and robots
globally. The specific issue of trust and autonomous vehi-
cles is actually linked to the question of who should be held
liableand it is important to thinkof liability asan instrument
to regulate behaviour. After all, more research is needed on
the question of whether liability really has a deterrent effect
and incentivizes more careful conduct [91–93].
3.6 Education and literacy
Given that overtrust may become increasingly problematic
with greater diffusion of autonomous systems, questions
emerge about how users of such technologies can be ade-
quately educated to prevent overtrust (which in turn can
lead to overreliance, as an outcome of trust is often a “risk-
taking behaviour” [94, p. 725], which includes use of and
reliance on automation [2,16,18]). Should passengers of
autonomous vehicles undergo dedicated safety training,
in the sense of a license and test tailored to inform them
about the capacities of the system at hand? What technical
and operational knowledge is needed to retain a critical and
rational stance towards the technology? Answers to these
questions will be pressing in different institutional contexts
such as mobility, healthcare, the law, households, and in
schools/education.
For example, institutional review boards (IRBs) that
oversee human participant research at universities and
other organizations will need to learn about and be pre-
pared for the use of AI, robots, and other digital interlo-
cutors in research. While it bears noting that institutions
are currently considering such advances, for example
with respect to ethical concerns, these considerations are
primarily aimed at physical safety or simple psychological
harms, like the previously referenced deception studies.
However, the unintended or longer term concerns such
as trust/overtrust, and the consequences of the physical
or psychological harms are ongoing fields of research,
with many facets to explore. Similar to what occurred
when scholars began to study the internet and online social
phenomena it will take some time to explore and under-
stand the consequences and nuances of both using robots in
research and using robots as research instruments or colla-
borators [95]. In the former case, there are already many
examples of research on HRI and human–machine commu-
nication that involve behavioural interventions between
a human subject and a machine. An example might be
a study undertaken to learn about subjects’ preference for
a robot’s movement. In the latter case, a robot might be
employed by a researcher to act as an interviewer or
observer and collect data via audio or video recording
and/or from other sensors. As was the case in the early
days of internet research, it is likely that ethical guidelines
will need to be developed and disseminated among
researchers and IRBs to help guide understanding and
evaluation of research protocols [96].
Finally, beyond user and oversight education, those
determining critical decisions regarding liability in auton-
omous systems similarly should be educated in how sys-
tems operate and their impacts. For example, as concepts
of liability/allocation of liabilities will play an important
role in creating trust, both legislators and the judiciary will
need to obtain a level of technological understanding to
appropriately regulate and enforce measures maintaining
safety and preserving community values. Without such
understanding there may be over-regulation, creating a chil-
ling effect on innovation, or under-regulation where indivi-
duals no longer trust technological advancements. While
regulation will always be one step behind innovation, under-
standing current systems and where developments are
heading can help keep critical players informed and
ready to tailor bespoke policies. Though scholars and
government entities (e.g. the EU’s Expert Group on
Liability and New Technologies) alike have begun to
address major gaps and issues within liability and reg-
ulatory schemes applicable to autonomous systems and
robotics, ongoing research is needed to modernize exist-
ing regulatory regimes, as well as to educate regulators
in order to update and propose appropriate safeguards
[97–100].
4 Conclusion
In this contribution, we offered an overview of pressing
topics in the context of overtrust and robots. In our
review, we mobilized insights solicited from in-depth
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conversations from a multidisciplinary workshop on the
topic, held at a leading robotics conference. The partici-
pants brought in their expertise, which allowed us to
formulate a forward-looking research agenda.
In light of the increasing use of automated systems,
both embodied and disembodied, overtrust is becoming
an ever more important topic. However, our overview
shows how the overtrust literature has so far been mostly
confined to HRI research and psychological approaches.
While philosophers, ethicists, engineers, lawyers, and
social scientists more generally have a lot to say about
trust and technology, conceptual clarity and a shared
framework for approaching overtrust are missing. In
this article, our goal was not to provide an overarching
framework but rather to encourage further dialogue from
an interdisciplinary perspective, integrating diverse litera-
ture and providing a ground for common understanding.
Our research agenda centres around the following six
topics:
First, the need for multidisciplinary definitions: While
we loosely converged on a mutual understanding of over-
trust as a gap between the real constraints of an auto-
mated system and its expected performance, we had to
acknowledge that trust is a very complex and elusive
construct. Scholars have offered dozens of definitions of
trust, stressing aspects such as risk, vulnerability, (lack
of) control, and expectation. The plurality of (sometimes
diverging) understandings naturally complicates a common
ground. We agreed that a relational perspective that focuses
quite strongly and descriptively, but not exclusively, on
rational dynamics and reliance is fruitful. The need for mul-
tidisciplinary definitions will stay relevant in the future and
empirical research could try to systematically map and con-
solidate existing scholarship (e.g. through a systematic lit-
erature review on overtrust).
Second, addressing deception by robots: Beyond con-
ceptual clarification, understanding the link between
overtrust and deception is a key aspiration for the com-
munity. Deception has emerged as an important topic
in robotics research. However, it is not necessarily bad,
as we have argued that deception may both be a cause
of and cure for overtrust in robots. However, what are
the short-term and long-term implications if deception
deliberately exploits people’s overtrust in robots? Robot
deception may lead to a corrosion of trust and coopera-
tion between humans [5], an argument in line with Dana-
her’s examination of robots as catalysts for moral revolu-
tions [58]. Regardless of the long-term consequences, the
short-term consequences of robot deception are both real
and important, and more attention should be directed
towards understanding and mitigating the potential nega-
tive consequences of such deception [63]. Simultaneously,
deception may both be unavoidable and beneficial as well,
which suggests a need to focus on balancing the good
against the good in this case.
Third, addressing anthropomorphization: In social robotics,
anthropomorphization is an important research theme,
showing the close relation between a robot’s design,
embodiment, and its affordances, including its perception
with aspects such as social bonding, social presence, trust,
and overtrust. We have discussed the ambivalence of
anthropomorphization and overtrust. Users might trust
human-like robots too much because they are perceived
as sentient, and such sentience might be construed as
reliable, benevolent, and honest. By contrast, users might
trust machine-like robots too much because they see
machines as more capable and unbiased than humans.
With complex systems, both a tendency for overreliance
in the form of a machine heuristic [101] and underreliance
in the form of algorithm aversion [102] have been demon-
strated. Future research ought to assess under which con-
ditions anthropomorphization produces overtrust.
Fourth, mapping the ecosystem: Robots and autono-
mous systems are at the crossroads of products and ser-
vices and embody a complex landscape of actors and
cyber–physical components which interact with each
other [71,72]. Fostering trust in such smart and connected
artefacts/systems should not be limited to the standalone
object or service itself, but should rather cover the entire
socio-technical ecosystem in which they are embedded.
Conversely, the issue of overtrusting robots and auto-
nomous systems should also extend to this complex
socio-technical environment. It is therefore important for
further research to better identify and map the numerous
actors, components, and functions involved in robots and
autonomous systems, as well as more clearly delineate
and understand the multilayered interactions within these
ecosystems. Such an endeavour will be crucial for asses-
sing the inherent risks associated with these robots and
autonomous systems. This should allow to both ade-
quately foster societal trust and help bridge the gap
between the perceived and actual risks, therefore miti-
gating potential overtrust invested in them.
Fifth, liability: From a legal perspective, overtrust in
technology is closely tied to questions of liability – or
who should be responsible for addressing the damage
caused by a robot or autonomous system. Our analysis
has shown that existing liability regimes are partly sui-
table to deal with overtrust in robots, including autono-
mous vehicles. Fault-based liability regimes, however,
might not be sufficient. Alternative liability regimes,
such as the EU Product Liability Directive or liability
for defective items will gain importance [89,90]. Future
research could look more closely at the interplay between
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(over)trust and legal responsibility. An evaluation of cur-
rent liability mechanisms’ failures/limitations in lever-
aging an optimal level of trust in these disruptive arte-
facts should be considered. Conversely, an assessment of
the liability implications of overtrusting such technologies
should be carried out. Finally, in light of these assessments,
and pending findings, further research could extend to con-
sidering normative evolutions whichwould address some of
the identified hurdles.
Sixth, education and literacy: Finally, we identified
a need to include the topic of overtrust more strongly in
curricula and literacy initiatives. Robotics programs at
higher education institutions could integrate some of
the aspects discussed above in their curricula to reflect
consciously on overtrust in design. However, literacy
should also be promoted in other settings where robots
and autonomous systems are developed, employed, and
regulated. User manuals could stress overtrust as a safety
risk and convey accessible information on the benefits as
well as downsides of overtrust with the specific robot.
From a research ethics point-of-view, new considerations
arise when robots are used for data collection as rela-
tively autonomous agents (in the sense of an interviewer
or social scientist). IRBs should familiarize themselves
with the latest developments in this regard. Finally, reg-
ulators and policymakers should likewise be prepared for
the level of sophistication required to appropriately ana-
lyse such emerging technologies.
Our interest in overtrust aligns with the European
Commission’s focus on trust and trustworthiness in the
context of AI [1]. Technical, legal, and social solutions to
overtrust should be given joint consideration as technol-
ogies such as autonomous vehicles enter the mainstream.
From a technological standpoint, value-sensitive design
could prevent users from overtrusting robots and show
the inherent uncertainties and constraints in autonomous
decision-making. In addition, teachings from research on
transparency and trust in the context of robots and AI could
come in handy [8,32,103]. From a legal/policy perspective,
diligent certification, updating liability regimes with clear
mechanisms, and consistently applying sectoral regulation
are crucial to ensuring that overtrust does not become too
much of a problem. While current legal regimes are ulti-
mately capable of handling harms caused by robots, mod-
ernization in interpretation and regulation are crucial to
continue evolving and responding to the legal challenges
posed by robotics. Finally, and from a social point-of-view,
literacy initiatives, as discussed in previous sections, and
meaningful expectation management among robot vendors
and operators couldmitigate overtrust. All in all, addressing
overtrust in HRI demands a multi-level analysis ranging
from the technical, individual, and societal levels. Conse-
quently, further research efforts examining overtrust should
comprehensively address the interplay between different
levels as such an undertaking is essential to understand
the impact of this phenomenon on society holistically.
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